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For good reason, boxing fans and insiders share the belief that their sport is dying.
Not convinced? Try naming one of the four current heavyweight champions. There
are four heavyweight champions, you ask? While only one team wins the Super Bowl
each year and only one golfer is fitted for a Green Jacket after winning The Masters,
boxing is in a league of its own by recognizing four "world champions" in each of
its weight divisions. With a modern history touting names such as Muhammad Ali,
Rocky Marciano, Joe Frazier, Joe Louis, Sugar Ray Leonard, and George Foreman,
one can ponder how a sport that at one time was second in popularity only to
baseball has fallen from such greatness. Years of corruption, manipulation, and
scandal have tarnished the sport to the point that it is hardly covered by the
mainstream media. In fact, up-and-coming sports like mixed martial arts-The
Ultimate Fighting Championship, for example-have surpassed it in popularity.
Some believe that Congress can be boxing's savior. Over the last decade, Congress
has passed the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996-aimed at protecting boxers
in the ring-and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act of 2000-aimed at further
improving safety, as well as giving boxers leverage at the bargaining table. In May
2005, the Senate passed the Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, which
would create the United States Boxing Commission to give punch to the sparsely
enforced provisions of the law currently on the books.
The intervention of Congress begs the question: given enough time and the right
legislation, can Congress "save " boxing? The traditional view in academia seems to
be that Congress can "save" professional boxing. However, this Note explores the
unfortunate reality that Congress cannot save boxing-it can only clean up certain
aspects of the sport because the business of professional boxing dictates otherwise.
The business of boxing is driven by the interconnectedness of promoters, managers,
and sanctioning organizations. Unless Congress gets into the business of mandating
bouts and promulgating rankings, the business of boxing will continue to rule the
day-and drive the sport into the ground. Given boxing's current state, legislative
reform can ameliorate several aspects of the sport such as safety in the ring and
protecting fighters from coercive contracts. Yet, this Note discusses the reality that
the business side of boxing will always govern and legislative efforts will always
have a limited effect.
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this Note. I would also like to thank my parents, family, and friends who developed an
interest in boxing for the sole reason of gaining a better understanding of why I am so
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has all of the ingredients of an Oscar-winning movie or a best-selling
novel-passion, glory, manipulation, scandal, corruption, a fall from
greatness, and a desperate fight for survival. This storyline is not the vision
of a screenwriter or novelist, but rather the nightmarish reality of the current
state of professional boxing. The sport that was once second in popularity
only to baseball' is believed by many to be dying.2 Sports like mixed martial
arts, arguably surpassing boxing in popularity through the Ultimate Fighting
Championship (better known as "UFC"), should be of major concern to
boxing fans and those involved in the sport.3 Years of manipulation,
corruption, scandal, and occasional deaths in the ring have scarred boxing to
the point where its popularity is at an all time low.4 There is a prevailing
view among boxing insiders and fans that the sport as a whole needs to be
"saved" 5-otherwise it could be "down for the count."' 6 The question
remains: Is there a hero in boxing's future who can come to the rescue and
save the sport by restoring its viability, popularity, and marketability?
I Russell Sullivan, ROCKY MARCIANO: THE ROCK OF His TIMvES 2-3 (2005).
2 See Jack Newfield, Should We Let Boxing Die?, PARADE, May 2, 2004 (statement
of Lou DiBella, former head of HBO's boxing division and current promoter: "The sport
is dying. It's like a cancer patient on chemo."); see also Thom Loverro, Down for the
Count?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at Cl (citing significantly decreased pay-per-view
buys, a lackluster heavyweight division with little star power, and the deficiency of major
fights that garnered much public attention as evidence that the sport needs help).
3 Cf Rick Maese, Ultimate Fighting's Popularity May Put Boxing Down for Count,
BALT. SUN, Aug. 26, 2006, at 2C (noting the 60,000 pay-per-view buys of the August
2006 heavyweight title bout between Oleg Maskaev and Hasim Rahman pales in
comparison to the conservative estimate of 500,000 pay-per-view buys of the August
2006 UFC card headlined by Chuck Liddell vs. Renato Sobral); see also Ivan Trembow,
UFC Surpasses $30 Million in PPV Sales, MMAWEEKLY.com, Sept. 6, 2006 (noting
UFC's July 2006 pay-per-view generated more than 775,000 buys at $39.95 each).
4 Newfield, supra note 2; see also Press Release, Rep. Cliff Stearns, Steams
Concludes Hearing on His Boxing Reform Legislation: Panel Reviews H.R. 1065, The
United States Boxing Commission Act (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/steams/PressReleases/PR2005Releases/pr-050303-Boxing.html.
5 Newfield, supra note 2; Brett Pully, The King and His Sport, at Twilight, FORBES,
Apr. 24, 2006, at 84-85. The cover of the magazine features a picture of Don King and
the headline reads: "Boxing's Last Great Hope? Don King Fights To Save A Dying
Sport."
6 Id.; see also Loverro, supra note 2; Maese, supra note 3, at 2C ("No headstone has




Boxing fans would like to believe that the answer to this question is a
resounding yes. Some even believe Congress is the likely hero and, given
adequate time, it can "save" the sport.7 Over the past decade, Congress has
attempted to reform several aspects of professional boxing. In 1996, it passed
the Professional Boxing Safety Act ("Safety Act") in an effort to improve
safety and medical standards within the sport. 8 In 2000, Congress
supplemented and supplanted the Safety Act by passing the Muhammad Ali
Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Reform Act") in an attempt to protect fighters at
the bargaining table.9 However, enforcement of these legislative measures
has been deficient and arguably nonexistent.10 The Senate's proposed
solution to the lack of enforcement is the Professional Boxing Amendments
Act of 2005; a bill that would create the United States Boxing Commission
("USBC" or "Commission")." The USBC would not only be in charge of
enforcing the current law, but would also be equipped to promulgate
regulations. 12 The Amendments Act passed the Senate on May 9, 2005.13
Yet, one of the two versions of the companion bill introduced in the House 14
failed on November 16, 200515 while the other has lingered idly in
committee since February 1, 2005.16 Congress has until the end of the second
session of the 109th Congress to pass the remaining bill before the
7 See Save the "Sweet Science," SEATrLE TIMES, Jun. 8, 2005, at B6; Patrick B.
Fife, Note, The National Boxing Commission Act of 2001: It's Time for Congress to Step
into the Ring and Save the Sport of Boxing, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1299, 1301 (2002).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2000).
9 Id.
10 Devin Burstein, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems and
Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 433, 459 (2003)
11 S.148, 109th Cong. (2005).
12 Id.
13 Bill Status and Summary, S.148, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (perform a "Bill Number" search for "S.148," click on "Bill
Summary & Status File" hyperlink, click on "All Congressional Actions" hyperlink).
14 Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, H.R. 468, 109th Cong. (2005)
(sponsored by Rep. Peter King); United States Boxing Commission Act, H.R. 1065,
109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Rep. Clifford Steams).
15 151 CONG. REC. H10355-56 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2005) (noting that H.R. 1065
failed 190-233).
16 Bill Status and Summary, H.R. 468, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (perform a "Bill Number" search for "H.R. 468," click on "Bill
Summary & Status File" hyperlink, click on "All Congressional Actions" hyperlink).
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Amendments Act is officially put to rest and reform proponents are sent back
to the drawing board.17
While Congress has taken these aforementioned steps to clean up certain
aspects of the sport, "saving" it is an entirely different story. It has been said
that passing the Ali Reform Act was the "equivalent of putting a band-aid
over a gaping wound that's badly in need of sutures."18 The lack of
enforcement of the law has made both boxing insiders and lawmakers
question its effectiveness. 19 More to the point, even if the law was enforced,
the roots of boxing's evils would continue to plague the sport, because the
worst of the problems appear to be beyond Congress' grasp. Realistically, in
order to be "saved," boxing would need drastic reform across the board. 20
Creating a commission to enforce the current law aimed at improving the
safety standards in the sport and preventing exploitation of fighters at the
bargaining table would certainly improve professional boxing. Yet, there are
limits to what legislation in this arena can plausibly reform because of the
means by which the infrastructure and business of professional boxing
operate.
This Note addresses the unfortunate reality that Congress will never be
able to "save" boxing because the behind-the-scenes operations are
conducted in such a way that the legislative efforts can only clean up parts of
the sport-but not save it. This Note examines the aspects of boxing that
Congress can successfully address-such as boxer safety and limiting
coercive bargaining-with proper enforcement of the Ali Reform Act
through additional legislation like the Professional Boxing Amendments Act.
More importantly, however, it explores the seemingly untouchable areas of
boxing that create the most problems for the sport as a whole. Finally, this
Note explains why these areas make it impossible for Congress to ever be the
sport's savior.
17 The 2nd Session of the 109th Congress ends on January 3, 2007. See, e.g., Al
Mariam, The Prospects of HR 5680 in the 109th Congress, ETHIOMEDIA.COM,
http://www.ethiomedia.com/addfile/hr_5680_prospects.html (noting the end date of the
2nd Session of the 109th Congress) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
18 THOMAS HAUSER, A YEAR AT THE FIGHTS 209 (2003) (referring to the passage of
the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act).
19 Burstein, supra note 10, at 459 (comparing the law to a jaywalking statute, noting
"[o]n paper, jaywalking laws prohibit people from crossing the street against the light,
but in practice, everyone still crosses against the light because there is little to no
enforcement.").
20 See infra Part III; Patrick Kehoe, Lou DiBella on Boxing Reform,
SECONDSOuT.coM, http://www.secondsout.com/World/colkehoe.cfm?ccs=222&cs=8639
(referencing a question posed to Lou DiBella regarding the importance of reform across
the board) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
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To provide a better comprehension of boxing's ills, it is essential to
understand the business of professional boxing. Part II of this Note examines
the problems created by the necessary business dealings among boxing's
essential players. Part III discusses the aspects of professional boxing in
which Congress can make a difference. Part IV addresses the inherent
limitations of governmental efforts at reform, which stem from the
infrastructure and nature of the business.
II. THE BusINEss OF BOXING AND THE MAJOR PARTIES
Professional boxing is unlike every other major professional sport in the
United States because it "does not have a strong, centralized association or
league to establish and enforce uniform rules and practices. ' 21 Major League
Baseball governs professional baseball, the National Football League
governs professional football, and the National Basketball Association
governs professional basketball. Boxing has no equivalent. 22 The absence of
a centralized organizing and oversight body is the cause of many of boxing's
problems.23 In its place, the business of boxing relies upon the
interconnectedness of numerous essential players: the boxer, the manager,
the promoter, the sanctioning organization, and the state athletic commission.
A. The Boxer
The boxer is the first individual necessary to effectuate a boxing match.24
The boxer is the one who physically trains for the fight, the one who enters
the ring, the one who throws and dodges punches, and the one who risks
physical peril at the hands of his opponent. 25 The overwhelming majority of
boxers come from impoverished backgrounds.26 Most enter the sport to
21 Sen. John McCain & Ken Nahigian, Symposium, Sports and the Law: A Fighting
Chance for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 7, 9 (2004).
22 See Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab at
Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2264-66
(2000).
23 See Newfield, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that "[b]oxing is still the only national
sport without a national commissioner to enforce safety standards, rules and integrity.").
24 Cristina E. Groschel, Note and Comment, Down for the Count: The Muhammad
Ali Boxing Reform Act and Its Shortcomings, 26 NOVA. L. REv. 927, 929 (2002).
25 Id.
26 JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 85 (1987) (estimating that nearly ninety-nine
percent of boxers come from impoverished backgrounds); see also THOMAS HAUSER,
THE BLACK LIGHTS 9 (1986) ("Most fighters come from tough places; small beginnings
where life is hard.").
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escape their tough surroundings and to pursue the dream of a million dollar
purse.27 For some, boxing is the only way they know to make a living.
28
Given the physical nature of prize fighting, boxers, by trade, risk their lives
every time they enter the ring.29 While most fans are familiar with the
premier side of the sport which features well-known fighters, notorious
promoters, and substantial paydays, "[m]ost boxing matches feature
unknown journeymen and women who apply their trade for small crowds in
exchange for nominal purse amounts." 30 In fact, "blue-collar boxing,"
featuring fighters who travel from town to town earning as little as $200-
$400 per fight, is much more common in professional boxing than in
championship fights with million-dollar payouts.31
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of every boxer is to become world
champion. 32 A boxer will receive exponentially higher paydays during his
reign as a titleholder than he will once he loses his belt. 33 For fighters who
cannot draw on name recognition alone,34 holding the title is essential to
earning the big payday. 35 Getting a title shot is something that the
overwhelming majority of boxers will never experience 36-and those that do
rarely get a second chance.37 Considering the level of athleticism, discipline,
skill, endurance, and courage necessary to excel at boxing,38 it is only logical
27 Fife, supra note 7, at 1301; see also McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 8
(noting that the premiere boxing bouts featuring famous boxers and promoters can have
purses of tens of millions of dollars).
28 See HAUSER, supra note 26, at 13 (quoting former light-heavyweight champion
Eddie Mustafa Muhammad: "If I didn't box, I would have been a bank robber.").
29 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 8.
30 Id.
31 Fife, supra note 7, at 1302.
32 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 27.
33 Symposium: Boxing at the Crossroads, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 256
(2001) (noting statement of Evander Holyfield that his payday per fight dropped from
$17 million to $2 million after losing the heavyweight championship belt to Riddick
Bowe. Holyfield claims "every time I get [the] belts the money increase[s].") [hereinafter
Boxing at the Crossroads].
34 Kehoe, supra note 20 (noting that fighters like Roy Jones and Oscar De La Hoya
do not need their belts to draw big paydays, but fighters like Eric Lucas benefit from the
marketing a belt provides).
35 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 256 (statement of Evander Holyfield)
("It's important. People say that it's not important but if you don't have the belt then
where do you go?").
36 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 27.
37 Id.
38 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 8.
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that a small percentage of fighters reach the level of the sport where large
sums of money can actually be earned.39 Yet, reaching the pinnacle of the
sport is not as clear-cut as other sports where wins and losses are
determinative. In fact, if a boxer's skill, win-loss record, and talent were the
actual determinants of who would be the next fighter in line for a shot at the
title, boxing would not be the subject of countless cries for reform. 40 The
truth of boxing is that getting a shot at the title is complex. It requires
working with the "right" manager and, in turn, the "right" promoter.41 Thus,
a boxer's road to the top starts by enlisting the services of a manager.42
B. The Manager
The manager is the fighter's business representative and is responsible
for handling all of the business dealings for the fighter.43 The manager's
primary purpose is to negotiate fight contracts securing the most amount of
money in the shortest amount of time and in the safest environment possible
for his fighter. 44 The manager owes a fiduciary duty45 to the fighter,
requiring that the manager act in the best interests of the fighter. 46 The
manager is typically compensated for his services by retaining one-third of
39 Fife, supra note 7, at 1301. As mentioned in Part III.A.2, infra, Greg Page was
fighting for a $1500 payday in the fight where he suffered career-ending injuries, even
though he was once the heavyweight champion of the world.
40 See Burstein, supra note 10, at 443 ("There would be no problem if the rankings
were based on the talent of the fighters, but this is not always the case.").
41 See Arlin R. Crisco, Note, Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to the
Continued Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1163
(1999); HAUSER, supra note 18, at 229 ("In sum, before DiBella, Hopkins was an
extremely talented fighter with limited name recognition who rarely made big money.
With DiBella in his camp, he became a star.").
42 Damon Moore, Down for the Count: Is McCain 's Bill the One to Lift Boxing off
the Canvas?, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 198, 201 (2005); see also HAUSER, supra note 26,
at 32 ("In many ways, professional boxing starts with managers. Fighters come and go,
but managers stay on, some of them seemingly forever.").
43 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 34.
44Id.
45 See Jim Thomas, How Fighters Can Protect Themselves Outside the Ring: Part
One, SECONDSOUT.COM,
http://www.secondsout.com/Ringside/business.cfm?ccs=356&cs=9841 (comparing the
manager-fighter relationship to the attorney-client relationship where both managers and
attorneys must pursue their clients' best interests while avoiding conflicts of interest).
46 Moore, supra note 42, at 201.
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the boxer's purse for each bout.47 Although managers typically are not well
liked, boxers depend on managers to direct and advance their careers.
48
Good managers in boxing have been compared to diamonds because they
are rare and hard to find.49 A good manager follows the cardinal rule and
never puts his fighter in a bout that he does not believe his fighter can win.
50
Furthermore, a good manager carefully selects opponents because one or two
bad losses can readily destroy a fighter's career.
51
C. The Promoter
In order to get his boxer fights, the manager must sign his fighter to a
contract with a promoter. 52 A fight promoter is responsible for arranging
bouts. 53 The typical deal between a fighter and a promoter is one in which
the promoter agrees to arrange a certain number of bouts for a specific dollar
amount. This money is then paid to the fighter and in exchange for his
services, the promoter retains the exclusive promotional rights of the fighter
for that number of bouts.54 While the promoter has a responsibility of acting
in good faith, the promoter does not owe a fiduciary duty to the boxer.
55
Because the promoter guarantees the payment of each boxer's purse and pays
all of the expenses associated with promoting and producing a fight, the
47 Groschel, supra note 24, at 930.
48 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 34; see also Groschel, supra note 24, at 930-31.
49 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 34.
50 Id.
51 Id. (quoting Emanuel Steward: "Every fight requires that I be in there looking for
an edge. And if I can find an opponent who gives the appearance of looking formidable
while posing no threat whatsoever to my fighter, that's fine.").
5 2 Hearings on Bus. Practices in Boxing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 105th Congress 43 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings on Bus. Practices in
Boxing] (statement of Patrick C. English, counsel for Main Events, Inc., discussing the
manager's negotiation role with a promoter).
53 See id. at 9 (statement of Fredric G. Levin) (listing the responsibilities of a fight
promoter).
54 See id. at 28-29 (statement of Patrick C. English) (indicating that although the
contract with the promoter may provide a certain guaranteed number of fights per year,
the promoter has a great deal of discretion and veto power by refusing to arrange a fight
with a particular opponent); see also Baglio, supra note 22, at 2260.
55 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 237-38 (statements of Lou DiBella
and Patrick English) (revealing that under case law, the promoter technically does not
owe a fiduciary duty to the fighter).
[Vol. 67:11871194
BOXING REFORM
financial risk is generally assumed by the promoter.56 The promoter does not
take a percentage of the purse, but instead keeps the difference between the
total revenues and total expenses for the promotion of a bout.57 The
significant sources of revenue are ticket sales, domestic and foreign
television rights, and advertising rights.58 The smaller the amount of money a
promoter can get a boxer to accept, the smaller the financial risk assumed by
the promoter and the greater the potential for profit.59 Given the financial
risks borne by the promoter, the boxer's financial interests are in direct
conflict with those of the promoter.60 Consequently, it is the manager's role
to vigorously represent the boxer by ensuring that his fighter does not end up
in a contract with unfavorable terms. 61
Although the promoter at one level is financially motivated to pay a
fighter as little as possible, the promoter does have an interest in seeing the
fighter become a top-ranked boxer because of the potential financial gain of
promoting a champion. 62 When the promoter puts on a non-televised bout
featuring club or unknown fighters, the margin for profit is very small, even
with a capacity crowd. 63 A promoter typically takes a financial loss early in
the fighter's promotional contract with the expectation that eventually the
fighter will compete in bigger bouts that can recoup the principal
investment. 64 In order for a boxer and promoter to get the largest payday and
a shot at the title, consistently winning fights and getting ranked by a
sanctioning organization are essential. 65
56 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2261 (noting that the risk is shifted away from the
promoter when television networks are involved); Kehoe, supra note 20.
57 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2261.
58 Id. at 2261-62.
59 HAUSER, supra note 26, at 69-70.
60 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2262.
61 Id.
62 Fife, supra note 7, at 1302.
63 HAUSER, supra note 18, at 258-59; see also Tim Sullivan, Going to School on the
"Sweet Science," SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 16, 2006, at DI.
64 Crisco, supra note 41, at 1173 n.213.
65 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2264.
2006] 1195
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
D. The Sanctioning Organizations
Worldwide, there are at least a dozen sanctioning organizations. 66 The
"three major" sanctioning bodies are the World Boxing Association
("WBA"), the World Boxing Council ("WBC"), and the International Boxing
Federation ("IBF"). 67 The World Boxing Organization ("WBO") is
occasionally included as the fourth of the major sanctioning bodies.68
Because they are often referred to by their abbreviations, these organizations
are often collectively known as the "alphabet soup."
69
Sanctioning organizations control two very important aspects of boxing:
sanctioning championship bouts and promulgating rankings of fighters.
70
"The power of these organizations is derived from the fact that without their
official sanction, a fight cannot be recognized as a 'championship bout,' and
thus is less attractive to both television and the viewing public." 71 In order to
gain an official sanction in a title fight, the sanctioning organization typically
charges a fee of three percent of each fighter's purse.72 If a fighter does not
agree to pay the sanctioning fee, he is not eligible to "win" the title, even if
he beats the title holder.73 The rankings of a sanctioning organization are
extremely important because they determine which fighters are eligible to
fight for the championship, and thus, the big-money purses.
74
In addition, rankings are absolutely critical in determining who is at the
top of the sport. Rankings are boxing's equivalent to NCAA football polls
because subjectivity is necessary to determine who is "number one" and who
gets a shot at the title. In order to get a title shot in boxing, a fighter generally
must be ranked in the top fifteen of a sanctioning organization's weight
66 Fife, supra note 7, at 1303; see also David Marsh, How to Win a World Boxing
Title, WEST AusTL., Feb. 28, 2006 (noting that there are twelve "world governing"
bodies).
67 Fife, supra note 7, at 1303.
68 Jones Jr. Wants Crack at Calzaghe, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM (Mar. 13, 2006)
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/more/03/13/jones.calzaghe.ap/index.html (noting
WBO title is considered to be "less prestigious").
69 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 195.
70 Fife, supra note 7, at 1303.
71 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2263.
72 Id.
73 Mayweather to Face Judah on April 8, POUGHKEEPSIE J., Feb. 8, 2006 (noting that
Zab Judah, the previously undisputed welterweight champion, was upset by Carlos
Baldomir on January 7, 2006. Because Baldomir only paid the WBC sanctioning fee and
not the IBF or WBA sanctioning fees, he only won the WBC version of the welterweight
title, but not the IBF or WBA belts-even though he beat their titleholder.)
74 Fife, supra note 7, at 1303.
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division. 75 Unless a fighter is ranked as the number one contender, however,
he is never guaranteed a shot at the title; only the number one contender is
ever guaranteed a title shot.76 Pursuant to the sanctioning body's rules, a
titleholder is generally required to fight the number one contender within a
nine to twelve month time frame, or the titleholder will be stripped of the belt
and title.77
Nevertheless, a continual problem in the sport is ascertaining the true
number one contender.78 This is because the rankings are subject to constant
manipulation 79 and have historically been corrupt.80 Therefore, and for good
reason, many credit sanctioning organizations are believed to be the root of
boxing's evils. 81 The harmful impact that the sanctioning bodies have on the
sport of boxing is discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this Note.
75 Groschel, supra note 24, at 938.
76 A title holder's refusal to fight a superior but lesser-ranked opponent was possible
before sanctioning organizations required mandatory bouts for number one contenders.
See, e.g., Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 201 (noting that uncrowned
heavyweight champion Archie Moore for years was never given a title-shot by
"champion" Joey Maxim because Maxim knew that he could not beat Moore. After three
years of waiting for the title shot and a public outcry for the bout, Moore knocked Maxim
out and was officially crowned champ).
77 The IBF heavyweight title holder has twelve months to defend a title; for all other
divisions, the IBF title holder has nine months to defend his title. IBF/USBA RULES
GOVERNING CHAMPIONSHIP CONTESTS, R. 5(A)(1) & 5(B)(1), INTERNATIONAL BOXING
FEDERATION, http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com/index.php?pg-3 (click on IBF/USBA
Rules Governing Championship Contests) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). A WBA non-
heavyweight titleholder must defend his title within nine months; a WBA heavyweight
titleholder has twelve months. WBC WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP REGULATIONS, R. 5.1.1-
5.1.2. , WORLD BOXING COUNCIL,
http://www.wbcboxing.com/WBCboxing/Portal/cfpages/category.cftn?nodeId=l .1 0&sho
wPage=category-down-2n (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). A fighter will have to vacate the
title if he is unable to arrange a match with the number one contender within the allocated
timeframe. See, e.g., Chris Givens, Wright Has Offer for Fight, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2006, at "Sports" (noting that WBC titleholder Jermain Taylor would
have had to vacate his WBC title if he could not work out a deal to fight mandatory
challenger Ronald "Winky" Wright).
78 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 201 (statement of Mills Lane) ("The
sanctioning bodies said ... [w]e will recognize a champion, and we will require the
champ to fight the number one contender in six months or we'll strip you. Sounds pretty
good, doesn't it? The trouble is [ascertaining] who is number one.").
79 See id ("There is manipulation.").
80 Groschel, supra note 24, at 938.
81 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 200 (statement of Mills Lane);
see also id. at 206 (statement of Jerry Izenberg) (describing the presidents of the three
major sanctioning bodies); "The major problem as I see it is the problem raised by both
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E. State Athletic Commissions
At the state level, state boxing commissions regulate boxing.82 State
commissions are charged with establishing and enforcing regulations in order
to protect the health and safety of boxers. 83 State athletic commissions also
determine the qualifications for referees and judges. 84 They license fighters,
managers, and promoters, and can suspend and revoke these licenses to bar
individuals from fighting or doing business in that state. 85 Forty-six state
commissions are loosely affiliated under the Association of Boxing
Commissions (the "ABC"). 86 Yet, because there is no federal boxing
commission, each state is free to promulgate its own regulations regardless of
the requirements of other states.87 Thus, when one state revokes or refuses to
grant a fighter a license, other states are not required to follow suit. 88 The
lack of uniformity allows situations to arise in which one state refuses to
grant a license to a "professional loser" 89-such as a fighter with 25 straight
losses-while a different state allows him to fight.90 Not surprisingly, such
scenarios can produce lethal results, including debilitating injuries and deaths
in the ring.91 The lack of adequate regulation by some state athletic
Mills Lane and Jerry Izenberg and that is the sanctioning organizations. Quite frankly
they have to go. They are not honest. They are not fair. They are not moral." Id. at 209
(statement of Amos C. Saunders, Retired Presiding Judge); "[E]verybody here [at this
symposium] has just about said that the sanctioning organizations are the problem." Id. at
222 (statement of Kathy Duva, promoter and CEO of Main Events, Inc.).
82 Moore, supra note 42, at 209.
83 See Hearings on Bus. Practices in Boxing, supra note 52 (testimony of Gregory P.
Sirb, President of the Association of Boxing Commissions).
84 See Baglio, supra note 22, at 2262.
85 Moore, supra note 42, at 209.
86 Fife, supra note 7, at 1305.
87 Burstein, supra note 10, at 438.
88 Moore, supra note 42, at 209.
89 Thomas Hauser, Professional Losers, SECONDSOUT.COM, July 15, 2003,
http://www.secondsout.comlUSA/colhauser.cfm?ccs=208&cs=12113 (last visited Oct.
22, 2006).
90 The Nevada Boxing Commission refused to let Bradley Rone fight on the grounds
that he had lost twenty-five straight fights. However, the Utah Athletic Commission
allowed Rone to fight, even though the state commission allegedly failed to conduct
proper physical and medical exams. See Jennifer Weaver, Judge Quashes Suit over
Boxing Death, SPECTRUM, Feb. 4, 2006,
http://www.thespectrum.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060204/NEWS01/602040311
/1002 (last visited Sept. 9, 2006); Julian Benbow, Taking a Punch Can Have Fatal
Results-Deaths in the Ring on the Rise, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 3, 2005, at SPORTS 8.
91 Bradley Rone died after lasting less than one round in a July 18, 2003 fight in
Utah. See Benbow, supra note 90. His career record was 7 wins (2 KO's), 43 losses, and
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commissions, as evidenced by allowance of "professional losers," gives
weight to the argument that a federal commission is necessary because states
operating individually cannot improve safety in the sport unless there are
uniform safety regulations nationwide. 92
III. PROBLEMS IN BOXING THAT CONGRESS CAN RESOLVE
The subject of boxing reform is like a heavyweight boxing champion
who has had too many fights: "[i]t's big, and it's important, but it's hard to
understand. '93 There are many issues plaguing professional boxing which
make it difficult to believe that there is a panacea that exists that can save the
sport. At the forefront of the issues of concern, however, is boxer safety. In
the past decade, twenty-four fighters died from injuries sustained in the ring,
fourteen of which occurred since 2000. 94 Although safety in the sport is
merely the tip of boxing's mountain of troubles, it is an issue that Congress
has addressed twice in the last decade by successfully passing legislation.
A. Protection for Fighters in the Ring: Health and Safety Issues
Two recent boxing incidents demonstrate the inherent danger associated
with stepping into the ring and the importance of proper ringside medical
care.95 The first incident involves the tragic death of Levander Johnson.
What is notable in this case is the superior level of medical attention
Levander Johnson received from the moment he was injured. The second
tragedy, suffered by Greg Page, illustrates the shameful consequences of
inadequate medical care and the lack of safety supervision at ringside. The
care received by Levander Johnson is the standard Congress likely
envisioned when it passed the Safety Act; the inadequate medical attention
received by Page is what Congress tried to eradicate with the Safety Act.
"While it may be an exaggeration to argue that all boxing-related deaths can
be prevented by federal regulation, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
promulgation of federal uniform health and safety standards would mitigate
the occurrence of unnecessary loss of life or serious injury."'96 Thus, the goal
3 draws. Bradley Rone, BoXREc.CoM,
http://www.boxrec.com/boxer display.php?boxer id=6636 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
92 Hauser, supra note 89.
93 Frank McNally, Taking the Regulation out of Irish Politics, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 20,
2005, at 8.
94 Benbow, supra note 90 (citing twenty-three deaths since 2000; Levander Johnson
died six weeks after the article was written).
95 Jim Lampley, Death in the Ring, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-lampley/death-in-the-ring-b-7939.html.
96 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 30.
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of Congress' reform efforts has been to reduce injuries like those suffered by
Greg Page.
1. Levander Johnson
Only days before stepping into the ring at the MGM Grand to face Jesus
Chavez on the under-card of an HBO pay-per-view event, Levander Johnson
told his hometown newspaper that he was confident he would beat Chavez,
"or die trying."97 On September 17, 2005, Johnson's statement proved to be
prophetic. 98 Referee Tony Weeks stopped the fight early in the eleventh
round as Chavez seemingly landed blows to Johnson's head at will. Less than
an hour later, Johnson underwent surgery to relieve a subdural hematoma99-
an injury that would shortly thereafter claim his life. 1°° Johnson's passing
marked the second death in a Las Vegas ring in a matter of weeks, 1 1 and the
third ring-related death on U.S. soil in six months. 10 2
While clearly a tragedy, famed boxing analyst Jim Lampley has stated
that Johnson died under "the best of boxing circumstances."1 0 3 Lampley
noted that during the fight Johnson was under the watchful eye of one of the
best ringside physicians in the country, 104 and that the fight was stopped at
the first obvious moment of trouble. 10 5 Furthermore, when asked in the late
rounds by his father-trainer if he wanted to continue fighting, Johnson
97 Lampley, supra note 95 ("It's the kind of thing boxers say all the time.").
98 Id.; see also Tim Dahlberg, Fatal Blow to Boxing Credibility, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 24, 2005, at 62. Less than three months earlier and several miles up the road from
the MGM Grand, injuries sustained in the ring claimed the life of lightweight fighter
Martin Sanchez after a July 1, 2005 bout at The Orleans. See Boxer Dies After Bout in
Las Vegas, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, July 4, 2005, at 7C.
99 Typically described as bleeding on the brain. Tom Scaletta, M.D., Subdural
Hematoma, EMEDICINE.COM, http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic560.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
100 Ryan Parry, Champ Loses Fight for Life, DAILY REC., Sept. 24, 2005, at 23.
101 On July 2, Martin Sanchez died of a severe brain injury sustained in a bout
against Rustam Nugaev in the ring only several miles from the venue of Johnson's bout.
See Fighter Dies of Bout Injuries, INT'L HERALD TR1B., Sept. 24, 2005, at 24.
102 In April 2005, Becky Zerlentes was the first American female boxer to die in the
ring. See Benbow, supra note 90.
103 Lampley, supra note 95.
104 Id. (noting that Dr. Margaret Goodman was the ringside physician). Doctor
Goodman was the Nevada State Athletic Commission's de facto chief ringside physician
and is chairman of the Commission's medical advisory board. See HAUSER, supra note
18, at 75.
105 Lampley, supra note 95.
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repeatedly answered in the affirmative. 10 6 Moreover, when the fight was
finally stopped and his symptoms were recognized, medics rushed Johnson to
the hospital and he was in surgery within the hour. 107
2. Greg Page
Compared to the ringside medical attention Levander Johnson received,
the injury suffered by former heavyweight champion Greg Page occurred
seemingly under the worst of boxing circumstances. 10 8 Fighting for a mere
$1500,109 the forty-two year-old Page collapsed in the tenth round of a fight
which he initially hoped would put him on track for "one last chance at a
title."1 1 0 Regrettably, the Kentucky Athletic Commission, the body in charge
of ensuring that adequate safety precautions were taken for the March 9,
2001 bout, failed to arrange for an ambulance to be onsite and available in
the event of a medical emergency."'1 During the time it took for an
ambulance to arrive, Page lay helplessly on the canvas suffering from brain
damage and a stroke. 112 To this day, Page is unable to walk without
assistance because of the paralysis of his left side as a result of the
incident,11 3 and he continues to suffer from complications more than five
years later. 114
3. The Status Quo: The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
Congress passed the Safety Act and the Ali Reform Act for the purposes
of "improv[ing] and expand[ing] the system of safety precautions that
protects the welfare of professional boxers ... [and assisting] State boxing
commissions to provide proper oversight for the professional boxing industry
106 Id.; see also Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 241-42 (statement of
Evander Holyfield) (noting that it is important for the boxer's comer and the referee to
know if the boxer is feeling well because "that's their job to see and make observations
where they should stop the fight or not").
107 Lampley, supra note 95.
108 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 29 ("The Kentucky commission's failure
to afford Page and the other participants in the boxing event adequate health and safety
protections is simply deplorable.").
109 Id. at 28.
110 Id.
l l Id.
112 Id. at 28-29.
113 Id. at 29.
114 Boxer Greg Page Is Breathing on His Own, USATODAY.COM, Mar. 1, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/boxing/2006-03-01 -page-health-x.htm?POE=SPOISVA
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in the United States. ' 115 Through the establishment of minimum safety
standards, this legislation is aimed at protecting the majority of the sport's
fighters-like Greg Page-who fight for hundreds of dollars instead of
thousands, and in matches that often take place without the benefit of proper
health and safety supervision. 116
The Safety Act, now incorporated as a part of the Ali Reform Act,
contains several notable provisions. First, the Act requires that state athletic
commissions oversee all professional boxing matches. 117 Second, the Ali
Reform Act requires an ambulance or medical personnel with appropriate
resuscitation equipment to be continuously present during all fights, and
requires a physician to continuously be present at ringside.118 Third, health
insurance must be provided for each boxer in order to cover any injuries
sustained in the ring. 119 Fourth, prior to a fight, a physician must conduct a
physical examination and certify that the boxer is physically fit to compete
safely. 120 Fifth, the Act "prohibits medically-suspended fighters from
participating in boxing matches in other states and assures that states are
aware that a fighter may be suspended in another state." 121 Sixth, the law
requires that all boxers must register for an identification card issued by the
boxing commission in the state in which the boxer resides; if the boxer is a
foreign resident or there is no state boxing commission where the boxer
resides domestically, he must secure an identification card from any state's
boxing commission. 122 Lastly, the Ali Reform Act also includes a conflict of
interest provision that prohibits state commissioners from receiving any sort
of compensation from business interests in the boxing industry.123
One of the major weaknesses of the Ali Reform Act is that states are left
to enforce the terms of the law, which, in turn, has caused medical standards
to deviate across the country. 124 For instance, "New York and Nevada are the
only states that require periodic MRI testing for fighters."'125 Furthermore,
115 15 U.S.C. § 6302 (2000).
116 141 CONG. REC. S16514 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain).
117 15 U.S.C. § 6303(b) (2000).
118 15 U.S.C. § 6304 (2000).
19 Id.
120 Id.
121 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 19.
122 15 U.S.C. § 6305 (2000).
123 15 U.S.C. § 6308 (2000).
124 See Moore, supra note 42, at 214; see also Fife, supra note 7, at 1308-09.
125 Thomas Hauser, Boxing's Medical Mess, SECONDSOUT.COM, May 27, 2004,
http://www.secondsout.com/home/home.cfm?CFID=9978705&CFTOKEN=-57472464
(noting "[o]ther states don't, and they should").
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the lack of an adequate national medical data bank, coupled with a
burgeoning practice of phony medical information being submitted to state
athletic commissions 126 is a combination that causes states to license boxers
who should not be in the ring.' 27 Likewise, when state boxing commissions
do not adhere to the terms of the Ali Reform Act, it is no surprise that the
effectiveness of the law will be questioned.' 28
Nevertheless, several recent cases involving Evander Holyfield and Joe
Mesi indicate that the Ali Reform Act has been somewhat successful at
improving safety regulation in the sport. After losing a unanimous decision
to Larry Donald in November 2004, Evander Holyfield was placed on
medical suspension by the New York State Athletic Commission, which
thereby barred him from fighting anywhere else in the United States. 129 Since
1999, Holyfield is 2-5-2 and "has appeared notably slower of foot and fist in
his last three fights, losses to Donald, James Tony and Chris Byrd."' 30 In
mid-August 2005, the New York State Athletic Commission lifted its
medical suspension but maintained an indefinite administrative suspension
because of "poor performance and diminished skills." 131 While the
administrative suspension does not bar him from fighting in other states, the
New York Commission has asked other states to follow suit. 132 Even though
Holyfield is no longer on the medical suspension list and has since begun a
"comeback," the Ali Reform Act served its purpose by barring the former
champion from fighting in any state until he underwent a series of medical
126 Id.
127 See Hauser, supra note 89 (noting the deviation amongst state medical standards
where fighters like Kenneth Bentley, holding a career record of eight wins, ninety-two
losses, one draw (and two knockouts) and only one victory in his last sixty-one fights, are
still able to obtain licenses in states like Tennessee).
128 Greg Page's injury occurred in a state that was not adhering to the terms of the
Ali Reform Act. The Safety Act, enacted nearly five years before Page's bout, requires
any person organizing a professional boxing match to have "an ambulance or medical
personnel with appropriate resuscitation equipment continually present on site."
Unfortunately, in addition to no ambulance being on site, the Kentucky Commission
failed to provide adequate medical personnel and resuscitation equipment at ringside at
the time of Page's collapse. McCain, supra note 21, at 29.
129 Steve Hummer, Holyfield Eyes Fight in Europe, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug.
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tests on his brain function, eyesight, and balance to determine if he was
medically sound. 133
With an record of 29 wins (25 knockouts) and no losses, Joe Mesi's
career was flourishing until the heavyweight suffered a subdural
hematoma-the same injury that claimed the life of Levander Johnson-after
a 2004 fight with Vassiliy Jirov. 134 Mesi's camp denied that he sustained the
injury, and the Nevada State Athletic Commission put Mesi on the medical
suspension list until appropriate documentation regarding the injury was
turned over to the Commission and evaluated. 135 Nevada's medical
suspension of Mesi kept him out of the ring for twenty-one months, until a
Nevada judge ruled that Mesi's medical suspension could not last longer than
his license. 136 This ruling has sparked concerns throughout boxing's
regulatory commissions. 137 The impact of the ruling is that a fighter who is
put on medical suspension shortly before his license expires may only be
suspended for a short period of time.138 After a fighter's license expires-and
he is subsequently removed from the medical suspension list-the fighter is
free to shop for a state with lax medical regulations which will grant him a
license, regardless of his questionable medical history. 139 As a result of the
Nevada court's ruling, Mesi has followed this exact course of action and has
been granted a license to fight in Puerto Rico. 140 Nonetheless, it is
noteworthy that the Ali Reform Act was the force keeping him out of the ring
since the time it was discovered that he had suffered multiple brain bleeds. 141
133 See id. Holyfield began his "comeback" with a solid showing against insurance
salesman and part-time boxer Jeremy Bates on August 18, 2006, in Parkersburg, West
Virginia. Holyfield hopes to become the heavyweight champion for the fifth time.
Holyfield Scores Second-Round TKO in Comeback, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug.
19, 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/scorecard/othemews.asp?articlelD=172667.
134 See Tim Graham, Mesi Decision Sparks Concerns, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 21,
2005, at Dl.
135 Hauser, supra note 125.
136 Graham, supra note 134.
137 Id. Counsel for Main Events, Patrick English, commented, "If there's ever an
argument made for a national boxing commission ... it was just made by this ruling." Id.
138Id.
139 Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Washington D.C. all have
notoriously lax boxing commissions. See id.
140 Tim Graham, Mesi, Free to Fight, Gets Puerto Rico License, BUFFALO NEWS,
Feb. 18, 2006, at B5.
141 See Graham, supra note 134.
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4. The Impact Additional Legislation and a Federal Boxing
Commission Would Have on Boxer Safety
As illustrated by the Holyfield and Mesi medical suspensions, Congress
has been able to address safety concerns in professional boxing with some
degree of success. The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005
("Amendments Act"), which the Senate passed on May 9, 2005, is a piece of
legislation that could additionally improve safety standards in the sport. 142 If
passed by the House, the Amendments Act would go a long way towards
accomplishing the aims of the original Safety Act. Title II of the
Amendments Act would create the United States Boxing Commission 143
("USBC" or the "Commission"). The purpose of the USBC is "to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of boxers and to ensure fairness in the sport of
professional boxing." 144 The USBC's primary functions would be to enforce
the provisions of the Ali Reform Act and the Amendments Act, and to
"promulgate uniform standards for professional boxing in consultation with
the Association of Boxing Commissions."' 45
The Amendments Act contains several notable provisions that have the
potential to enhance safety regulation in professional boxing significantly.
First, all matches would have to be approved by the Commission and held in
a state or on tribal land that regulates boxing matches "in accordance with the
standards and criteria established by the Commission." 146 As not to bog
down the sport with red tape, Commission approval of matches would be
presumed 147 except for matches where there has been an alleged violation of
the Ali Reform Act, matches that are advertised as "championship" bouts,
matches scheduled for ten rounds or more, or matches in which one of the
fighters has either "suffered ten consecutive defeats in professional boxing
matches... or has been knocked out five consecutive times in professional
boxing matches."148 These provisions would seemingly force those states
with virtually no standards 149 into compliance with the minimum standards
promulgated by federal law. States that do not abide by these regulations
142 S. 148, 109th Cong. (2005).
143 Id.
144 Id. at § 201.
145 Id. at § 203(b)(2).
146 Id. at § 4(a)(2).
147 Id. at § 4(b)(1).
148 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong.
§ 4(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2005).
149 Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Washington D.C. all have
notoriously lax boxing commissions. Graham, supra note 134.
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would likely be restricted by the Commission in their ability to host
professional boxing matches. Consequently, the practice of forum-shopping
for a lenient state athletic commission would vanish.
Second, all boxing matches would be required to have both "an
ambulance continuously present on site" and "emergency medical personnel
with appropriate resuscitation equipment continuously present on site."150
Third, the Amendments Act would mandate the creation of "a medical
registry that contains comprehensive medical records and medical denials or
suspensions for every licensed boxer." 151 Having a medical registry would
ensure that accurate medical information is properly shared, 152 thereby
addressing the practice of parties submitting phony medical information, as
well as the "don't ask, don't tell" policies153 currently employed in some
states.
Lastly, the Amendments Act would require that all boxers, managers,
and promoters be licensed by the USBC. 154 This provision would take the
licensing power out of the hands of the states and would allow uniform and
nationally consistent standards with regard to licensing of fighters like Joe
Mesi and Evander Holyfield. Furthermore, the Nevada court decision
limiting medical suspension to the duration of the boxer's license would
effectively be nullified, and upon expiration, the USBC would likely refuse
renewal of licenses for fighters with checkered medical histories-like Mesi.
In addition, licensure by the USBC would address the problem of
"professional losers" being licensed by lax state boxing commissions. Under
this provision, a fighter with an egregious loss record and a significant
history of being knocked out would be protected for his own benefit. 155
B. Protection for Fighters at the Bargaining Table
While the Amendments Act focused on protecting boxers inside the ring,
the problem of managers and promoters taking advantage of fighters at the
bargaining table was prevalent enough to generate Congressional action.
150 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong. § 6(3)-
(4) (2005).
151 Id. at § 16.
152 Hauser, supra note 125 ("Boxing needs a national medical data bank so that
accurate information is properly shared. Often, this information is unavailable. And
worse, some stat commissions seem to have a 'don't ask, don't tell' policy.").
153 Id. ("[Some states] don't want to know about facts that might preclude a
particular fight from taking place in their state.").
154 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong. § 204
(2005).
155 See Hauser, supra note 89.
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Following the passage of the Amendments Act, fighters "continued to be
exploited in their contractual agreements" with managers and promoters.' 56
As previously noted in Part II, when a boxer turns professional, he must enter
into contracts with managers and promoters in order to get fights. 157 Early in
a boxer's career, negotiations with promoters and managers are often one-
sided because "the average fighter has virtually no bargaining power or
leverage."' 158 Consequently, contracts produced under this arrangement are
often "for extended or unlimited terms, place little or no obligations on the
promoter and provide for little guaranteed compensation to the boxer, beyond
bare minimums."1 59 Such contracts are highly favorable for promoters
because the risk of financial loss is minimal if the fighter is unsuccessful; if
the fighter is successful, the payoff to the promoter is substantial.1 60 Prior to
the Ali Reform Act, "it was a common practice for a promoter who had
successful boxers under contract to require that any challenger who sought to
fight one of these boxers sign a long-term agreement with the promoter."' 61
The typical arrangement was often one where the promoter who represented
the champion but not the challenger would compel the challenger to sign an
"option contract" that would bind the challenger to the champion's promoter
for a certain period of time if the challenger won the bout. 162 The "option
contract" would allow the promoter to maintain exclusive control over the
titleholder of a particular division, regardless of the bout's victor, because
any challenger would have no choice but to agree to the promoter's terms in
order to get the opportunity to fight for the championship.' 63 One example of
the "option contract" in practice occurred in 1996 when challenger Evander
Holyfield was required to sign a long-term promotional agreement with Don
King just to have the opportunity to fight heavyweight champion Mike
Tyson, a fighter who had an existing promotional agreement with King. 164
Unfortunately for Holyfield, in 1996 this type of coercive contract was
standard in the industry. "Boxers often agree to these types of coercive
contracts for fear of being blackballed by the promoter."' 65 Like countless
fighters before and after him, Holyfield had no option but to agree to King's
156 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 20.
157 See supra Part II.
158 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2269 (citation omitted).
159 Id. (citation omitted).
160 Id.
161 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 20.
162 See Baglio, supra note 22, at 2272.
163 Id.
164 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 20.
165 Id.
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terms-otherwise the fight between him and Tyson for the championship
would have probably never occurred. 1
66
Congress addressed the exploitation of boxers at the bargaining table
with several notable provisions in the Ali Reform Act. The law now contains
"key financial disclosure requirements for promoters and sanctioning
organizations, including a requirement that promoters and sanctioning
organizations inform state boxing commissions of charges, costs, and fees
subtracted from a boxer's purse."' 67 In addition, the Ali Reform Act bans
contracts it considers to be unfairly coercive,1 68 such as "option contracts,"
which are forbidden if they are longer than twelve months. 169 Furthermore,
promoters are prohibited from requiring a mandatory contender to sign an
"option contract" in order to compete in a title bout when the fight is
mandatory under the rules of a sanctioning organization. 170 Under the terms
of the Ali Reform Act, if the Holyfield-Tyson-King incident from 1996
occurred today, Holyfield would not be obligated to sign a long-term
promotional agreement with King in order to fight Tyson so long as the
WBA ranked Holyfield as the number one contender; the title defense would
be mandatory under the WBA's mandatory contender rule.
17
The strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining table protections in the
Ali Reform Act have been well documented. 172 One consistent criticism of
the law that has not gone unnoticed by Congress is the lack of
enforcement. 173 The varying degree of oversight can be attributed to the lack
of resources given to boxing regulation by each state, or to a lack of interest
amongst state attorneys general charged with enforcing the Ali Reform Act's
provisions. 174
If created, the USBC would ensure that, at the very least, someone is
responsible for guaranteeing that the terms of the Ali Reform Act are
166 See Baglio, supra note 22, at 2272.
167 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 21.
168 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a) (2000).
169 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(1)(A)(i).
170 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(b).
171 The 1996 Holyfield-Tyson bout was for the WBA Heavyweight Title. See
Evander Holyfield, BoxREC.CoM,
http://www.boxrec.com/boxer-display.php?boxer-id=499 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
172 See Moore, supra note 42, at 215-20; Burstein, supra note 10, at 446-65; Fife,
supra note 7, at 1310-13.
173 Ted Stevens, The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. REP. No.




enforced-which would certainly be an improvement of the status quo. 175
The Amendments Act contains several provisions that would seemingly
improve the current situation for boxers at the bargaining table. First, the
Commission would develop, in consultation with the Association of Boxing
Commissions, "guidelines for minimum contractual provisions that shall be
included in each bout agreement, boxer-manager contract, and promotional
agreement. Each [state] boxing commission shall ensure that these minimal
contractual provisions are present in any such agreement or contract
submitted to it."'1 76 Second, managers and promoters are required to submit
to the Commission a copy of all boxer-manager contracts and promotional
agreements. 177 Third, state boxing commissions are prohibited from
approving a professional boxing match unless a copy of the bout agreement
related to that match has been filed with and approved by that state's athletic
commission. 178 In addition, state boxing commissions are prohibited from
approving a professional boxing match unless the promoter of that match has
posted a surety bond, cashier's check, letter of credit, cash, or other security
in order to ensure that the boxers are properly compensated according to the
terms of the bout agreement.1 79 Lastly, and most importantly, the USBC
would be bestowed with the power of granting and revoking licenses not
only for boxers, but also for promoters and managers. 180 Promoters and
managers found to have engaged in coercive bargaining with boxers in
violation of the terms of the Ali Reform Act would have their licenses
suspended or revoked by the Commission. 181 Don King is currently feeling
the wrath of license revocation and, at present, is barred from promoting
matches in Atlantic City casinos because of his refusal to answer questions
about bribes he paid to former IBF president Bob Lee. 182 The USBC would
hold the same power at the national level. The USBC's suspension or
revocation of a license would effectively bar a promoter or manager found to
175 Id. at 4-5.
176 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong. § 9(a)
(2005).
177 Id. at § 9(b)(l).
178 Id. at § 9(b)(2).
179 Id. at § 9(c).
180 Id. at §§ 204, 207.
181 Id. at § 207.
182 King Wants Back in Garden State, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 1, 2005, at C08. The
New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement has refused to grant him the license
necessary in order to promote boxing matches in New Jersey casinos until King answers
questions about payments made to the former IBF president. Id. King is not barred,
however, from promoting fights at nearby Boardwalk Hall, a non-casino venue home to
many of the premier fights in Atlantic City.
2006] 1209
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
have violated the Ali Reform Act from engaging in any promotional or
managerial capacity in professional boxing anywhere within the borders and
territories of the United States.
IV. BOXING'S PROBLEMS BEYOND CONGRESSIONAL REACH
Perhaps the biggest problem plaguing the image of professional boxing is
the behavior of the sport's sanctioning bodies.183 As mentioned in Part II,
sanctioning organizations play a major role in the sport because they sanction
championship fights and rank boxers.1 84 Unlike other sports that measure
standings objectively based upon win-loss records, playoffs, or tournaments,
rankings in boxing are derived from the combination of subjective factors
such as the quality of a win and the quality of the opposition, in addition to a
fighter's objective win-loss record. 185 Given the business of boxing, rankings
play a tremendous role in the sport.
A. Rankings/Ratings186
Due to a historical record of corruption and manipulation, the rankings of
the sanctioning organizations lack credibility. 187 Former judge and boxing
referee Mills Lane has addressed the legitimacy of the rankings by
commenting: "Anybody who doesn't believe there is manipulation of the
ratings about who is number one, I've got some ocean-front property in
Nevada which I'll be happy to sell you." 188
Ratings are important not only because they, in theory, are supposed to
rank the best fighters in each particular weight class, but also because they
determine the value of the fighter and his payday potential. 189 When a boxer
is ranked within the top ten or fifteen fighters in a weight class (depending on
the sanctioning organization), he is eligible to fight the reigning champion
183 For a summary of opinions expressed about the sport's sanctioning bodies, see
supra note 81.
184 See supra Part II.D.
185 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2265-66.
186 The terms "ratings" and "rankings" are interchangeable.
187 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 210 (statement of Paul Feeney)
("The ratings organizations, several of which are based out of [this] country, they have
virtually no oversight. And some of their actions are just preposterous and you'd have to
say that the rating system in professional boxing has less credibility and confidence
among the boxers and the fans than any other sports rating system in the world.").
188 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 201 (statement of Mills Lane).
189 Groschel, supra note 24, at 938.
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for the title. 190 More importantly, the boxer ranked as the number one
contender is guaranteed a title shot, generally within a nine to twelve month
period, 191 depending on weight division and the rules of the sanctioning
body.' 92 Typically, a championship bout will draw greater television
revenue-and thus a bigger purse-than a bout where there is no belt on the
line. 193 Yet, a continual problem for the sport is ascertaining the true number
one contender 194 due to omnipresent manipulation 195 and corruption. 196
1. Corruption and Manipulation in Rankings
The business of boxing is structured in such a way that the rankings
matter a great deal to the sport because they determine title shots and
paydays. 197 When ratings are based on factors other than talent and skill, the
sport suffers. 198 The public is deceived, and boxers are exploited. 199 "The
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., WBC WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP REGULATIONS, R. 1.21(b), WORLD
BOXING COUNCIL,
http://www.wbcboxing.comWBCboxing/Portal/cfpages/category.cfm?nodeld= 1.10&sho
wPage=category-down-2n (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). (requiring a title holder to defend
his belt against the mandatory challenger-the number one contender-within a twelve
month window).
192 The IBF heavyweight title holder has twelve months to defend a title; for
divisions other than the heavyweight division, the IBF title holder has nine months to
defend his title. IBFIUSBA RULES GOVERNING CHAMPIONSHIP CONTESTS, R. 5(A)(1),
R. 5(B)(1), supra note 77. A WBA non-heavyweight title holder must defend his title
within nine months; a WBA heavyweight title holder has twelve months. WBC WORLD
CHAMPIONSHIP REGULATIONS, R. 5.1.1-5.1.2, WORLD BOXING COUNCIL. A fighter will
have to vacate the title if he is unable to arrange a match with the number one contender
within the allocated timeframe. See Chris Givens, Wright Has Offer for Fight, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2006 (noting that WBC title holder Jermain Taylor will
have to vacate his WBC title if he cannot work out a deal to fight mandatory challenger
Winky Wright).
193 Kehoe, supra note 20 (statement of Lou DiBella) (noting that promoters have a
better chance of selling a fight to a network if any of the alphabet soup titles are on the
line rather than if it is just a good ten-round fight).
194 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 201 (quoting Mills Lane: "The
sanctioning bodies said ... [w]e will recognize a champion, and we will require the
champ to fight the number one contender in six months or we'll strip you. Sounds pretty
good, doesn't it? The trouble is [ascertaining] who is number one.").
195 See, e.g., id. at 201 (statement of Mills Lane) ("There is manipulation.").
196 Groschel, supra note 24, at 938.
197 See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.




fighters that truly suffer from these disreputable practices. are the good but
unconnected fighters who cannot get rated because they do not have the
money or [the] connections .... 200 Furthermore, manipulated rankings can
make it difficult for some fighters near the top to actually reach the top. A
boxer holding the title is never compelled to fight a potentially better, but
lesser-ranked opponent unless that opponent is recognized as the number one
contender.201 As will be discussed in Part IV.A.3 of this Note, even this
system is problematic because each of the major sanctioning bodies refuses
to even rank the title holder of another major sanctioning body. This means
that the WBA titleholder will never be compelled to fight the IBF titleholder,
who will never be compelled to fight the WBC titleholder because the holder
of another organization's title will preclude a fighter from being ranked, let
alone being ranked as the number one contender.
Under this system, if a promoter represents a titleholder, the promoter
has an incentive to ensure another one of his fighters is ranked as the number
one contender. Therefore, regardless of the winner or quality of the
mandatory bout, the promoter will maintain control in that division and will
retain the promotional rights for the next title contest.20 2 The number one
contender, in theory, should be the boxer in the division with the best
possible chance of ousting the champion. 20 3 However, it is common for the
sanctioning organizations and promoters to "manipulate the entire
situation" 204 to make it otherwise.
At one level, manipulated rankings are problematic because they can
create deadly mismatches which place inferior fighters against champions
with unquestionably superior skills.205 Such a scenario occurred on
November 13, 1982, when WBA champion Ray "Boom-Boom" Mancini
delivered a fatal knockout to the WBA's number one contender, Duk Koo
200 Burstein, supra note 10, at 443.
201 A titleholder's refusal to fight a superior but lesser-ranked opponent was also
possible before sanctioning organizations required mandatory bouts for number one
contenders. See, e.g., Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 201 (statement of Mills
Lane) (noting that uncrowned heavyweight champion Archie Moore for years was never
given a title shot by "champion" Joey Maxim because Maxim knew that he could not
beat Moore. After three years of waiting for the title shot and a public outcry for the bout,
Moore knocked Maxim out and was officially crowned champ.).
202 Id. at 218 (statement of Max Kellerman) (noting Don King's interest in having
his boxer, Evander Holyfield, fight the number one contender, John Ruiz, another one of
King's boxers. Regardless of the victor, King will represent the number one contender
and will have a say in the next heavyweight title bout).
203 See id.
204 Id. (statement of Max Kellerman).
205 Burstein, supra note 10, at 443-44.
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Kim of Korea-a fighter who, bizarrely enough, was not even ranked
amongst Korea's top 40 boxers. 206 At a more important level, however,
manipulated rankings detract from the legitimacy of a championship title.
Historically, promoters have been able to manipulate the ratings by
bribing the sanctioning organizations in exchange for more favorable ratings
or for the organization's sanctioning of a fight. Promoter Bob Arum, in an
egregious example of corruption, admittedly bribed the WBA in order to get
one of his boxers a championship fight in 1983.207 When questioned about
his payments to the WBA, Arum replied, "[tihat was the only way you could
do business in those days."208 Unfortunately, "those days" of which Arum
was speaking are not behind him or the sport; in August of 2000, Arum was
fined $125,000 by the Nevada State Athletic Commission for bringing
"dishonor" to the sport through his admitted bribing of former IBF president
Bob Lee. 209 Promoter Cedric Kushner was fined $175,000 by the Nevada
State Athletic Commission for also admittedly bribing the former IBF
president with payments of $2,500 to $10,000 "several times" '210 and
"$100,000 in one instance in exchange for the federation['s] sanctioning of a
George Foreman heavyweight title fight against Axel Schulz." 211 Lee is
currently serving prison time for money laundering, tax evasion and
racketeering related to this incident.212
Boxing writer and historian Bert Sugar has encapsulated the deceitful
and self-serving conduct213 of the sport's sanctioning bodies by noting:
"They don't just take money under the table, [t]hey take it around the table,
over the table and sometimes they take the table too." 2 14
206 Id. at 444.
207 Steve Springer, Arum Paints a Dark Picture; Boxing: In Transcripts Obtained by
the Times, Promoter's Testimony in Racketeering Trial Details Money Laundering and
Bribery in the Sport, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at D1.
208 Id.
209 Dean Juipe, Kushner Hit with Fine of $175,000, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 27, 2000,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2000/nov/27/511092398.html.
210 Promoter Fined for I.B.F. Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
211 Id.
212 Only In America-Atlantic City Honors Barred Boxing Promoter King,
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Mar. 13, 2006,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/more/03/13/bc.box.donkingplaza.ap/index.html.
213 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 15.
214 Steve Springer & David Wharton, A Rank System: Boxing's Credibility Takes
Another Hit as Sanctioning Bodies' Methods for Determining Big-Money Fights Come
Under Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at D1.
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2. The Credibility of Rankings
Within the last several years, the credibility of ranking organizations has
been further called into question when it was discovered that a boxer who
had died from a non-boxing related illness was still ranked four months after
his death. Incidentally, not only was the fighter still ranked, but he had
actually moved up in the rankings after he died.215 A year after winning a
July 1999 fight against boxer Dave McClusky on a third-round TKO, Darren
Morris appeared in the number-ten slot of the World Boxing Organization
(WBO) super-middleweight rankings even though he had not fought since
beating McClusky.2 16 Then, in October 2000, without fighting again, Morris'
WBO ranking improved to number seven. 217 By that time, however, Morris
had passed away. 218 Nevertheless, Morris' career "continued to flourish" 219
until Independent reporter Steve Bunce broke the story that four months after
Morris' death, the WBO had a corpse ranked fifth in their super-
middleweight ratings.220 Although this bizarre incident had nothing to do
with corruption, it shed light on the triviality of the WBO's rankings and its
championships. 221
While not as preposterous as ranking a dead man, the WBC and WBA
have ventured down the same path as the WBO by continuing to rank Felix
"Tito" Trinidad even though he retired a day after being beaten by Ronald
"Winky" Wright in May 2005.222 On February 3, 2006, nearly ten months
after he announced his retirement, the WBC still had Trinidad ranked sixth in
their middleweight division, which was up one spot from their previous
rankings published in January 2006.223 In the WBA's December
2005/January 2006 rankings, Trinidad was not only ranked, but he improved




219 Id. at 209-10.
220 Id.
221 Tim Graham, New WBO Division: Dead Weight, ESPN.cOM, Feb. 20, 2001,
http://espn.go.com/boxing/columns/graham/1097210.html.
222 John C. Cotey, A Bruised and Broken Fighter, Trinidad Retires, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 17, 2005, at IC ("Wright landed 262 punches to Trinidad's 58 in their 160-
pound showdown, broke his nose in the second round, and won every round on one
judge's card and 11 of 12 on the others.").
223 WORLD BOXING COUNCIL, RATINGS & CHANGES IN THE RATINGS OF USA





to number three in the middleweight division-up one spot from their
November 2005 rankings.224 Either the WBA and WBC have erroneously
made the oversight that Trinidad, one of the bigger names in the sport, had
retired or they were both comfortable in continuing to promulgate inaccurate
rankings. Regardless of their reasoning, such carelessness detracts from their
credibility and is a detriment to the sport.225
3. Failure to Follow Rules-and Logic
Each of the major sanctioning bodies has a constitution and set of rules,
obtainable from their respective websites. 226 Whether each follows its own
rules, however, is another matter.227 As one boxing writer noted, "[t]he
WBC, the WBA, the IBF and the WBO answer to no one; they make, break,
and bend the rules whenever it's convenient, blatantly, and not-so-blatantly
stretching the bounds of absurdity." 228
One of the most absurd policies followed by all the major sanctioning
bodies is their refusal to rank the recognized champion of another
sanctioning organization. 229 Each sanctioning organization, in essence,
promotes its own "champion" and top contenders by ignoring other
"champions." 230 The IBF, for example, has a rule that states "[the] WBA and
WBC World Champions will not appear in the [IBF] numerical ratings."231
In practice, however, the IBF deviates from its written rule by not ranking the
WBO titleholders, even though the rule-nonsensically--only prohibits the
ranking of WBC and WBA champions. 232 The principle of refusing to rank
224 Id.
225 Scott Mallon, Stop the Insanity-Enough Is Enough, THESWEETSCIENCE.COM,
Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.thesweetscience.com/boxing-article/3294/stop-insanity-enough-
enough/.
22 6 INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com; WORLD
BOXING COUNCIL, http://www.wbcboxing.com; WORLD BOXING ASSOCIATION,
http://www.wbaonline.com; WORLD BOXING ORGANIZATION, http://www.wbo-int.com.
227 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 243 (statement of Patrick English,
General Counsel of Main Events) (noting in reference to the mandatory challenger rule
that the role of the sanctioning organization is only effective if it follows its own rules).
228 Mallon, supra note 225.
229 S. REP. No. 106-83, at 11 (1999).
230 McCain & Nahigian, supra note 21, at 24.
231 INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, IBF RATINGS CRITERIA, R. 2, available at
http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com/userfiles/File/IBF%20Ratings%20Criteria.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
232 A comparison of the February 23, 2006 IBF Rankings with the February, 2006
WBO Rankings reveals no WBO champion in any IBF numerical ranking. Cf
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another organization's champion contradicts the IBF tenet that "[r]atings
must be solely based on win/loss records, level of competition, [and]
activity." 233 This refusal to rank titleholders of other sanctioning
organizations reveals that the numerical rankings are based on money and not
skill. 234  "This can lead to the dubious situation where... a
boxer.., universally considered to be the best in the world by his fellow
boxers, industry members, fans, and the media.., is not rated in the top
fifteen of many of the organizations who profess skill in rating fighters[,]" 235
simply because he holds another organization's title.236
The problem of not recognizing another's champion leads to rankings
such as those illustrated in Table 1. Table 1 shows the 147-pound
welterweight division rankings of the WBC, WBA, IBF, WBO current
through February 26, 2006. Table 1 also includes rankings promulgated by
The Ring,237 an independent commercial magazine. The Ring is viewed with
mixed opinions of credibility among boxing fans and insiders due to a 1976
corruption scandal. 238 The Ring, however, does what the "major" sanctioning
organizations do not, which is to include boxers in its numerical rankings
regardless of the title that they may hold.
INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, IBF RANKINGS FOR FEBRUARY 2006, available at
http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2006); WORLD BOXING ORG.,
RANKINGS FOR FEBRUARY 2006, available at http://www.wbo-int.com (last visited Oct.
22, 2006).
2 3 3 See INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, supra note 226.
234 See S. REP. No. 106-83, at § 5 (1999).
235 Id.
236 See Burstein, supra note 10, at 443.
237 The Ring magazine is the self-proclaimed "Bible of Boxing," available at
http://www.thering-online.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
2 3 8 See Ring Magazine Scandal, in BOxREc BOXING ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.boxrec.com/media/index.php/RingMagazineScandal (last visited Oct. 22,
2006); see also Eddie Goldman, Should Titles Be Won in the Ring or in The Ring?,
THESWEETSCIENCE.COM, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.thesweetscience.com/boxing-
article/3321/should-titles-won-ring-ring, (discussing objections to The Ring's ratings and
noting that the magazine is just one voice in boxing-not the voice). Cf Mallon, supra
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One egregious example of the sanctioning organization's failure to
follow logic is illustrated in Table 1, which shows that as of February 26,
2006, the welterweight division had four "champions." Until January 7,
2006, Zab Judah was the "undisputed" welterweight champion, having
captured the WBC, WBA, and IBF welterweight titles. 239 Judah lost a 12-
round unanimous decision to Carlos Baldomir, yet Baldomir did not get the
three titles or the "undisputed" tagline.24° After the fight, it was revealed that
Baldomir only paid one $3000 sanctioning fee 241 to the WBC-but not to the
IBF or WBA-and was therefore ineligible to "win" either of those titles. 242
Baldomir told reporters in his post-fight press conference: "My purse was
only $100,000 .... If I paid each of them the required 3%, I would have
come away with nothing." 243
In response to Judah's loss, the WBA vacated Judah's claim to their
welterweight title, leaving Louis Collazo as the sole WBA Welterweight
champion.244 Nevertheless, in another departure from its own rules,245 the
IBF shamefully announced that they would still recognize Judah as their
champion.246 The end result was that the boxer who beat the "undisputed"
champion was, according to two of three sanctioning organizations, not the
champion of the welterweight division.
239 Mitch Abramson, Baldomir Upsets Judah, N. Y. TiMEs, Jan. 8, 2006, § 8, at 11.
240 Id.
241 Baldomir's total purse was $100,000. A three percent fee would be $3000.
Baldomir Snatches WBC Title from Zab, LIVERPOOL ECHO, Jan. 9, 2006, at 38.
242 Id.
243 Id. Paying all three sanctioning fees would have cost Baldomir nine percent, or
$9000, of his $100,000 purse. In addition, Baldomir's manager likely took more than
$33,000 or one-third of the total purse, given the standard fee arrangement between
boxers and managers.
244 Bernard Fernandez, Money Brings King, Arum Closer, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
14, 2006.
245 IBF/USBA Rules Governing Championship Contests, R. 5(H) Unsanctioned
Contests states:
If a Champion participates in an unsanctioned contest within his prescribed weight
limit and loses the bout, the title will be declared vacant. The Championships
Committee, with the approval of the [IBF] President, will then establish a new
Champion in that division in accordance with the procedures established and
prescribed in these rules.
INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com (click on "Ali
Amendment" link, click on "IBF/USBA Rules Governing Championship Contests") (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
246 Fernandez, supra note 244.
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In addition, Table 1 illustrates the disparity in the February 2006
welterweight rankings across the board. Only two fighters, Walter Matthysse
and Mark Suarez, are ranked in the top ten of all four sanctioning
organizations; no boxer is ranked by all four sanctioning organizations and
The Ring.247 The National Football League has only one Super Bowl
champion; only one hockey team hoists the Stanley Cup at the end of the
season; each year, only one golfer gets the legendary green jacket for
winning the Masters. 248 Yet, in each weight division, boxing tolerates four
world champions at any given time thanks to the existence of four "major"
sanctioning bodies. Figuring out who is second or third-best is nearly
impossible when the sport cannot figure out who is the best.
4. Dealing with the Mess
One proposed solution to dealing with the sanctioning organizations is
simply not to reference them by name.249 Fighters have started to question
paying exorbitant sanctioning fees on the grounds that they, the fighters,
bring the credibility to the title thereby making them important, not vice
versa.250 Yet, sanctioning organizations exist because they have the titles that
fighters want. 251 Fighters want the respect that comes with being the
undisputed champion of the world.252 Fans want to watch championship
fights. Thus, the sport needs a way to figure out who is number one and the
sanctioning bodies have stolen this role. 253 Because the value of a fighter's
247 One view attributes the disparity in the welterweight division to the incentive for
fighters, like Floyd Mayweather, to bypass the 147-pound division and opt for the better
competition and big money for fights at 140 pounds and under, or at 154 pounds and
over. David Mayo, Mayweather Stuck in a Corner: Lucrative Options Limited After
Judah Ruins a Big Payday, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 10, 2006, at D1.
248 Eddie Goldman, Four's Company, THESWEETSCIENCE.COM, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://www.thesweetscience.comboxing-article/3382/four-company (noting that "no
[other] major sport crowns four world champions at the same time").
249 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 244 (statement of Max
Kellerman) (suggesting that if the media boycotted using the letters WBC, WBA, IBF,
and if fights were considered title fights, the sanctioning organizations would "cease to
exist, at least in this country. They just wouldn't exist."). HBO announcers do not
recognize any sanctioning organization by name or by initials on the air. Id. (statement of
Lou DiBella).
250 Id. at 247 (statement of Max Kellerman) (noting Oscar De La Hoya's
dissatisfaction of paying the WBC when it is his personal credibility being lent to the
sanctioning body).
251 Id. at 249 (statement of Lou DiBella).
252 Id. at 248 (statement of Patrick English).
253 Id. at 247 (statement of Jerry Izenberg).
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payday depends on his ranking, or his ownership of a belt, the sanctioning
organizations will not disappear simply because the media refuses to talk
about these organizations by name. In the end, promoters depend on belts
and titles to sell their fights.
Congress's response to the ratings problem can be found in the Ali
Reform Act and the Amendments Act. The Ali Reform Act requires the
Association of Boxing Commissions to develop and approve "guidelines for
objective and consistent written criteria for the ratings of professional
boxers."254 The Amendments Act reiterates Congress's desire for rankings to
be based on "objective and consistent written criteria ... based on the
athletic merits and professional record of the boxers." 255 Yet, relying on
objective criteria alone would be unworkable256 because subjectivity in
rankings is unavoidable. Referring to Table 1, welterweight fighter Mark
Suarez recently jumped in the IBF rankings from eighth to the number one
contender 257 after a technical knockout of James Webb forty-four seconds
into the first round of their January 7, 2006 bout.258 Going into the bout, the
IBF ranked Webb tenth in the welterweight division;259 the WBA ranked him
ninth. 260 Even under the most detailed objective formula, Suarez's victory
could never be gauged on a purely objective standard. Suarez beat a fighter
that was ranked in the top ten of the welterweight division by two
sanctioning bodies in less than a minute. Whether or not such a victory
deserves to be rewarded by the IBF with its number one contender rating or
with an eight-spot jump to sixth in the WBA rankings will always be a
254 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(a) (2000).
255 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong. § 12(a)
(2005).
256 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2266 (noting that because it would be impossible and
impractical for a fighter to face every other fighter in his weight division in order to
determine a champion, basing rankings only on objective factors is impracticable).
257 INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, IBF RANKINGS FOR DECEMBER 2005,
http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com (click "Rankings" link, select Welterweight and
December 2005) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006); INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, IBF
RANKINGS FOR JANUARY 2006, http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com (click "Rankings" link,
select Welterweight and January 2006) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
258 Mark Suarez, BoxREc.cOM,
http://www.boxrec.com/boxer..display.php?boxer.id=8969 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
2 5 9 INTERNATIONAL BOXING FEDERATION, IBF RANKINGS FOR DECEMBER 2005,
http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com (click "Rankings" link, select Welterweight and
December 2005) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
2 6 0 WORLD BOXING ASSOCIATION, WBA NOVEMBER 2005 RANKINGS,
http://www.wbaonline.com/ratings/rankings/2005/wball05.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2006).
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subjective call. The quality of a victory and the quality of opposition 261 can
only be measured subjectively, which, in turn, makes this aspect of the sport
beyond the reach of Congressional reform.
In addition, Congress is unable to address the sheer number of
sanctioning organizations given boxing's free market. ESPN boxing analyst
Max Kellerman has astutely noted that there is a tradeoff262 by having four
"major" sanctioning organizations, and potentially up to 68 "world
champions." 263 'The issue is short term versus long term goals and the thing
is, in the short term, more belts do mean more money for more fighters. It
creates a larger [boxing] middle class in the short term."264 The long-term
tradeoff is that the credibility of the sport's "champion" label suffers by
having four boxers who claim to be the best and no system to sort it out. The
business has built such a reliance on the rankings and the titles of the various
sanctioning organizations that eliminating one or several of the sanctioning
bodies could have serious financial ramifications for boxers who are
currently in the "middle class." 265
a. No Union, No Pension
The unfortunate truth of the sport is that many fighters retire with brain
and bodily damage266 and are in debt either to creditors or to the government
261 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2266.
262 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 249.
263 See David Marsh, How to Win a World Boxing Title, WEST AusTL., Feb. 28,
2006, at 59 (noting that in addition to the four "majors," there are eight additional "world
governing" bodies and seventeen weight divisions, yielding the potential for 204 "world
champions" in a sport that used to only have eight).
264 Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 249.
265 See id.
266 See Fife, supra note 7, at 1301; see also Kevin M. Walsh, Boxing: Regulating a
Health Hazard, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 63, 67 (1995) (noting that boxing
has the highest morbidity rates and the highest potential for neurological damage of any
of the major sports). "The theory of chronic brain trauma in veteran professional fighters
is well-known as 'punch drunkenness' but is more accurately Parkinson's Syndrome-a
neurological disorder that causes tremor, muscle rigidity, and slowed movement. While
Parkinson's Syndrome is a symptom of Parkinson's Disease, it can also develop through
repeated blows to the head." Crisco, supra note 41, at 1140 n. 11. Muhammad Ali suffers
from Parkinson's Syndrome. See THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALI: HIs LIFE AND
TIMES 488-94 (1991). Greg Page cannot walk without assistance due to injuries from a
stroke suffered in the ring. See Part III.A.2, supra.
1222 [Vol. 67:1187
BOXING REFORM
for back taxes.267 Furthermore, the lack of education and business experience
of many fighters makes them susceptible to exploitation from the parties with
whom they come into contact during their careers. 268 Even those fighters that
become champions and earn large purses can find themselves in a state of
insolvency 269 due to the fact that up to half of their earnings often go to
managers, trainers, and licensing fees to the sanctioning organizations. 270
Unlike other major team and individual sports, boxing has no union or
representative association. 271 Unions and players' associations in other major
sports have been responsible for establishing pension plans for their retired
athletes.272 Thus, operating without a union, it is no surprise that boxers are
left without a pension upon retirement. 273 In addition, the existence of
players' unions in other sports has established a dispute resolution system
curiously absent in boxing-arbitration. 274 "The quick resolution of disputes
is a necessity in industries [like boxing] where participants have a relatively
short period of participation. The lack of a system of arbitration in boxing
leaves boxers with the inadequate remedy of long, drawn-out courtroom
proceedings." 275
Although some boxers and union representatives are free to lead a
campaign to unionize professional fighters,276 Congress cannot force a union
on those in the sport or lead the charge for union organization. 277 Even with a
private movement, unionization may be resisted among fighters because of
the tremendous power that sanctioning organizations and promoters hold.
The fear of retaliation is enough to quiet even the biggest names in the
267 HAUSER, supra note 18, at 247. See, e.g., Justin Doom, Doom's Day: On the
(Financial) Ropes, Oct. 21, 2005, CNN.CoM,
http://sportsilustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/justin-doom/ 0/2 1/dooms.day/1 .htm.
268 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2260.
269 Overtime, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 18, 2005, at C02 (noting former heavyweight
champion Riddick Bowe filed for bankruptcy, listing more than $4.1 million in claims
against him); see also Stan Grossfeld, Spinks: Riches to Rags: Former Heavyweight
Champ Now Custodian in Nebraska, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 26, 2005, at C9.
270 Fife, supra note 7, at 1302.
271 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2267.
272 Id.
273 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 255 (statement of Bert Sugar:
"This is the only sport where they give us something, their blood and their lives and we
ain't giving them anything.").
274 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2267-68.
275 Id. at 2268.
276 See Boxers Organizing Committee, http://www.boxers.org (last visited Oct. 22,
2006).
277 See generally Crisco, supra note 41.
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sport. 278 In addition, judging from the current state of Social Security, it is
unlikely that Congress will devise and implement a boxer pension plan
anytime soon.279 This problematic aspect of boxing is one with no readily
available solution, even for Congress.
b. Congress Cannot Reform the Business of Boxing
In other sports, there would be a playoff or some sort of tournament in
order to determine a weight division's true champion. However, boxing is
different. There is no centralized body to run the show. At the championship
level, promoters and matchmakers determine the fights they are willing to
showcase based upon the potential to generate revenue. For instance,
referring back to the welterweight division recorded in Table 1, the WBO's
welterweight champion, Antonio Margarito, fought Manuel Gomez on
February 18, 2006.280 Margarito's bout was shown on pay-per-view not
because the fight had the potential to generate significant buys, but because
no American network would purchase the bout.281 By the same token,
boasting a record of 40 wins (30 KO's) and zero losses, the IBF and WBA
light-welterweight champion, Ricky Hatton, initially balked at a $700,000
deal to fight WBA welterweight champion Louis Collazo because "he didn't
think it was worthwhile ... to go [up] to 147 pounds to fight somebody who
was not 'the man' in the [welterweight] division." 282
Other than mandatory challenges, no bout between two highly rated
fighters must ever occur. Even when a titleholder is compelled to defend his
title, vacating the belt may be the more desirable option rather than agreeing
278 See Boxing at the Crossroads, supra note 33, at 255 (statement of Greg Sirb)
(noting an instance where Roy Jones, Jr. was called to testify before a Senate committee
on the issue of boxing reform, but opted to have a statement read in his place out of fear
of retaliation).
279 Some states have taken the initiative to establish boxer pension plans. See, e.g.,
THE CURRENT BOXERS' PENSION PLAN BENEFITS ONLY A FEW AND Is POORLY
ADMINISTERED, CALIFORNIA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION,
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/reports/highlights.php?id-479.
280 Antonio Margarito, BOxREC.CoM,
http://www.boxrec.com/boxer display.php?boxerlid=1 1677 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
281 Both HBO and Showtime passed on distributing the fight. Goldman, supra note
248.





to a bout that would not yield a substantial payday. 283 A ranked fighter
without drawing power or name recognition will repeatedly get passed over
by promoters and champions, so long as a bigger payday could be had by a
promoter using a more-popular, lesser-ranked fighter. If a promoter
represents a highly-rated fighter, such as a number one contender, Congress
will never be able to deny the promoter the right to pair that fighter with
another one of the promoter's own fighters. In essence, Congress will never
be able to solve the problem of fighters needing the "right" promoters in
order to get the big fight.284 As the bearer of the financial risk in promoting a
fight,2 85 a promoter is free to handpick opponents and to position his own
fighters in a manner that allows him to maintain control over the division and
title.
Unless the United States Boxing Commission or a similar body
federalizes the sport by promoting fights, dispensing out titles, and
promulgating rankings-all things the USBC is specifically prohibited from
doing under the Amendments Act 286-the business of boxing will continue
in the cycle that perpetuates its problems. Reform initiated by the sport's
most influential fighters, promoters, and managers is highly unlikely because
most of the people involved on every level, including the well-to-do, more
established, richer stars themselves-the fighters-all of them, benefit from
the system as it presently exists. The networks, the ratings organizations[,]
they are all very comfortable ... everyone is comfortable with the status
quo." 28
7
283 Jermain Taylor considered vacating his WBC title while his promoter, Lou
DiBella, was engaged in negotiations with Winky Wright's management in January 2006.
Wright, the number one contender in the middleweight division, wanted a 50/50 split
with Taylor, who was the WBA, WBC and WBO middleweight champion. Givens, supra
note 77.
284 See Crisco, supra note 41, at 1163 (1999); HAUSER, supra note 18, at 229 ("In
sum, before DiBella, Hopkins was an extremely talented fighter with limited name
recognition who rarely made big money. With DiBella in his camp, he became a star.").
285 Baglio, supra note 22, at 2261 (noting that the risk is shifted away from the
promoter when television networks are involved); Kehoe, supra note 20.
286 The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2005, S. 148, 109th Cong. at
§ 203(c)(1) (2005) ("The Commission may not--(1) promote boxing events or rank
professional boxers.").
287 Kehoe, supra note 20 (statement of Lou DiBella).
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V. CONCLUSION: BOXING WILL NEVER DIE
Despite its problems, Lou DiBella is accurate in saying that "boxing will
never completely die." 288 "[I]t has survived on the fact that people will
always be interested in watching people f[ornicate] and watching people
fight. You can marginali[z]e boxing and [it] can become more of a niche
sport[,] but you are not going to eliminate something that is so [e]ngrained in
the sensibilities of people." 289
Congressional attempts at reform can improve professional boxing.
However, Congress' role in boxing reform will always be limited to cleaning
up certain problematic aspects of the sport. The business of boxing, however,
is structured in a way that prevents Congress from reaching all of the sport's
ailments. There are too many aspects of boxing well beyond congressional
reach that need to be addressed in order for it to be the sport's savior. Fans
should recognize that the sport's savior is not perched on Capitol Hill in
Washington, D.C. Rather, their sport's savior, if there is one, is likely to
come in a form that has brought other major sports to prominence--one in
which a centralized oversight body has the power to promulgate "official"
rankings, designate "official" champions, bargain with a collective
bargaining representative of all fighters, manage the day-to-day operations,
and bring credibility and fans back to the sport. Add to the mix a competitive
heavyweight division with a charismatic and dominant champion, 290 and
boxing could be back in the limelight. Until then, boxing fans better get used
to the status quo.
288 Newfield, supra note 2.
289 Kehoe, supra note 20 (statement of Lou DiBella).
290 The old saying in boxing is "as goes the heavyweight division, so goes boxing."
Frank Lotierzo, Two Glamor Divisions: Now a Boxing Waste Land!,
EASTSIDEBOXING.COM, http://www.eastsideboxing.com/news.php?p=396&more=l (July
1, 2004) (noting that although this saying has been beaten to death, it is unfortunately
true.); "Only the real boxing fans know who the top fighters are in the divisions below
heavyweight, besides the obvious superstars like Roy Jones and Oscar De La Hoya." Id.
1226 [Vol. 67:1187
